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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AS THE SERVANT
OF POLITICS
Louis Michael Seidman*
Any assessment of what the Constitution is bad at must be
grounded in a theory of what it is good for. So let me begin with
a brief statement of such a theory: The Constitution is mostly
good for providing a platform external from our ordinary politics
from which current arrangements can be criticized.
This theory does not entail the view that all that matters is
criticism. Any sensible political system requires legitimation as
well as destabilization. The theory merely asserts that our ordinary political processes already provide very powerful legitimation. We do not need constitutional law to endorse results that
our existing political system has already endorsed.
Nor does the theory entail the view that constitutional law
necessarily privileges change. Political systems need to change,
but they also need to maintain continuity. Although the Constitution can promote change, it can also appropriately entrench the
status quo by providing a platform to criticize proposals for
change.
The theory does entail the view that a constitutional provision that does no more than make us more satisfied with outcomes that already satisfy us is not accomplishing anything
worthwhile. This is so because constitutional law should serve as
a corrective to ordinary politics, and, so, is corrupted when it becomes the servant of politics.
If one shares my view of what the Constitution is good for, it
follows, I think, that it is quite bad at dealing with problems of
criminal procedure. If the Constitution were doing its job, it
would obstruct and destabilize our political impulses concerning
crime control. Yet today, the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments function mostly to make us satisfied with a state of affairs
that should trouble us deeply.
Here are two facts about American criminal law: The United
States has the most elaborate and detailed constitutional protec•
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tions for criminal defendants of any country in the world. The
United States also has the second highest incarceration rate of
any country in the world.t
The relationship between these two facts (if, indeed, there is
one at all) is controversial. Some critics of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments argue that they stymie effective law enforcement, thereby encouraging crime and requiring a high incarceration rate. Although this connection is theoretically possible, it is
quite implausible. The best data available suggest that criminal
procedure protections are doing very little to obstruct successful
prosecutions. For example, a tiny percentage of criminal cases
are lost or "no papered" because of fourth amendment
problems.2 Virtually every empirical study of the impact of Miranda suggests that it has not reduced the rate at which suspects
confess.J The poor quality of criminal defense work has led some
distinguished commentators to conclude that counsel now serves
primarily as a barrier to the defendant's participation in his own
trial.4
In contrast, some defenders of the Constitution's criminal
procedure provisions argue that incarceration rates would be
even higher if these protections were unavailable. This claim is
1. As of June, 1994, there were 1,012,851 men and women incarcerated in state and
federal prisons. See State and Federal Prison Populalion Tops One Million, Department
of Justice Press Release, October 27, 1994. The United States is now behind only Russia
in incarceration rates. It has an incarceration rate more than four times that of Canada,
more than five times that of England and Wales, and fourteen times that of Japan. See
Steven A. Holmes, Ranks of Inmates Reach One Million in a 2-Decade Rise, N.Y. Times,
at 1 (Oct. 28, 1994).
2. In the course of an opinion arguing that the exclusionary rule imposes unacceptable costs, Justice White was forced to concede that "[m]any ... researchers have concluded that the impact of the exclusionary rule is insubstantial." United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897,908, n. 6 (1984). A General Accounting Office study showed that in federal
criminal prosecutions, 0.4% of cases were not prosecuted because of illegal search
problems. Evidence was excluded in 1.3% of cases studied, and only 0.7% of those resulted in acquittals or dismissals. Report of the Comptroller General of the United
States, Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions 8-14 (1979).
Studies of state prosecutions yield similar data. See National Institute of Justice, Criminal
Justice Research Report - The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California 1
(1983); Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn)
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost"
A"ests, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 611.
3. For a good summary of the empirical evidence, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Chi. L Rev. 435, 455-461 (1987).
4. See Uoyd Weinreb, Denilll of Justice: Criminal Process in the United States 112
(1977). Cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer and David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense:
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of
Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 73, 86 (1993) ("(I]f the Chief
Defender values attorneys for their ability to move cases quickly and to persuade reluctant defendants to plead guilty, the accused might be better off making his own, poorly
informed choice.")
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similarly implausible. By now, the Fourth Amendment is so riddled with exceptions and limitations that it rarely prevents the
police from pursuing any reasonable crime control tactic.s
Although the Supreme Court continues to insist on the ritualistic
reading of Miranda warnings, judges have virtually gone out of
the business of actually policing the voluntariness of confessions
and regularly sanction the sort of coercive tactics that would have
led to the suppression of evidence a half century ago.6 The
courts have been satisfied with formal rules requiring the presence of counsel in the courtroom, while tolerating actual courtroom performances that make a mockery of the formal
protections.1 And even when a defendant can demonstrate that
the prosecution has violated minimal Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment protections, the recent evisceration of habeas
corpus means that there may be no court available to entertain
her claim.s
It seems unlikely, then, that the criminal procedure amendments have either exacerbated our crime problem or provided an
effective bulwark against police and prosecutorial overreaching.
5. In many contexts, the Court has refused "to transfer from politically accountable
officials ... the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger," and concluded that "the
choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the government officials who
have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources." Michigan Dept. of Stale Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 {1990). The modem Court has
declined to treat "probable cause" as a fixed and rigid requirement that the police must
meet before privacy is invaded. Instead, it is a "practical, nontechnical conception,"
Brinegar v. United Stales, 338 U.S. 160, 176 {1949), that is "not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules." ll/inois v. Gales, 462 U.S. 213,232 (1983). The Court
has insisted that the expertise of the officer at the scene be taken into account, United
Stales v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975), and that he not be shackled by post hoc judicial
second guessing. lllinois v. Gales, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983). Even if the police act without
probable cause, they need not fear the exclusion of evidence if they reasonably rely on a
warrant, see United Stales v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and the warrant and probable
cause requirements themselves are riddled with exceptions. See e.g., New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691 (1987) (exception for administrative searches); California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565 {1991) (exception for automobiles); Skinner v. Railway Labor Execulives' Assn.,
489 U.S. 602 {1989) (exception for "special needs").
6. In the quarter century since Miranda, the Court has reversed only two convictions on the ground that post-Miranda custodial interrogation produced an involuntary
statement, compared with twenty-three Supreme Court reversals on voluntariness
grounds in the comparable time period immediately preceding Miranda. See Louis
Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 673, 744-45 & nn. 239, 240 {1992).
7. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (judicial review of counsel's performance should be "highly deferential" and "indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.")
8. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) {habeas unavailable after
procedural default); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 {1989) ("new rules" generally unenforceable on habeas); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule generally unenforceable on habeas).
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A third possibility is more plausible: constitutional protections
intended to make prosecution more difficult instead serve make
the prosecutor's job easier.
This reversal of the historic mission of the criminal procedure amendments functions on both the individual and the global
level. In individual cases, criminal procedure protections make
the punishment we inflict on criminal defendants seem more acceptable. Although the amendments do little to make the prosecutor's job harder, people commonly believe that they obstruct
the prosecution of dangerous criminals. Some doubt and ambivalence that might otherwise accompany the use of violent and
coercive sanctions is thereby dissipated.
On the global level, criminal procedure protections serve to
redirect and exacerbate the popular anger about crime. While
crime rates have remained static and even declined slightly in recent years,9 the rate of incarceration has skyrocketed.to There is
no easy way to demonstrate that the crime rate would not be
higher if we had incarcerated fewer people, but, at a minimum,
these statistics demonstrate that the increased rate of incarceration is not caused by an increase in crime. Instead, it seems to be
fed by the public perception that crime is out of control and that
still more draconian punishments are necessary to deal with it.
Popular misconceptions about criminal procedure protections feed this perception. Because people believe that "legal
technicalities" set large numbers of guilty and dangerous
criminals free, they think that too many miscreants are escaping
punishment. Because they believe that the problem could be
brought under control if only the "legal technicalities" were
changed, they fail to focus on the bankruptcy of mass-incarceration as a crime fighting strategy.
In the United States today, over one million people are imprisoned, the largest number in our history and the second largest percentage in the world.u One out of every 193 adult
Americans is behind bars, and the total inmate population is
9. The most recent data, from 1993, indicate that the crime rate fell by three percent from the previous year, the second consecutive year of decline. The violent crime
rate showed an annual decline of two percent. See Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Crime in the United States, 1993: Uniform Crime Reports 11 (1993).
10. For the first six months of 1994, while the crime rate was declining, the number
of prisoners grew by nearly 40,000, the equivalent of 1,500 per week. In the last decade,
the United States prison population has doubled on a per capita basis. See State and
Federal Prison Population Tops One Million, United States Department of Justice Press
Release, Oct. 27, 1994.
11. Id.
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roughly equivalent to that of the city of Phoenix.12 Despite the
absence of any evidence that these extreme measures have
helped to control crime, political pressures grow for still more
prisons, longer sentences, and more executions.
The criminal procedure amendments have done nothing to
slow this decline into barbarism. Instead, they have contributed
to an atmosphere that promotes acceptance of a situation that
ought to shock us.

12. See Pierre Thomas, U.S. Prison Population, Continuing Rapid Growth Since
'80s, Surpasses 1 Million, Washington Post, at 3 (Oct. 28, 1994).

